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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS 
ALAN M. TRAMMELL∗ 
Opponents of nationwide injunctions have advanced cogent 
reasons why courts should be skeptical of this sweeping rem-
edy, but one of the arguments is a red herring: the constitu-
tional objection. This Essay focuses on the narrow question 
of whether the Article III judicial power prohibits nation-
wide injunctions. It doesn’t. 
This Essay confronts and dispels the two most plausible ar-
guments that nationwide injunctions run afoul of Article III. 
First, it shows that standing jurisprudence does not actually 
speak to the scope-of-remedy questions that nationwide in-
junctions present. Second, it demonstrates that the Article III 
judicial power is not narrowly defined in terms of according 
relief only to the actual parties to a lawsuit. Thereafter, the 
Essay situates nationwide injunctions within several twenti-
eth century remedial innovations that fundamentally altered 
how citizens hold government accountable. In short, nation-
wide injunctions are not remedial anomalies and are con-
sistent with constitutional limits on judicial power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Not every bad idea is unconstitutional.1 Those of us in the 
academy who have defended nationwide injunctions recognize 
that they are usually inadvisable.2 Scholars can debate (as we 
do) whether the game is worth the candle—that is, whether sit-
uations calling for nationwide injunctions are so vanishingly 
few that the prudent course is to reject them altogether.3 But 
whatever else one might say about them, nationwide injunc-
tions are not unconstitutional. 
The constitutional debate about nationwide injunctions 
has trained on a specific problem: whether, in the absence of a 
properly certified class action, a federal court may issue an in-
junction against the government that expressly—and not just 
incidentally—benefits nonparties. Consider one of the most 
conspicuous recent examples. Two weeks after President 
Trump’s inauguration, a court prevented his administration 
from enforcing certain aspects of the so-called “travel ban”4 
against anyone, not just the plaintiffs in the lawsuit.5 Therein 
lies the crux of the current debate. Those who maintain that 
nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional argue that while a 
court has power to issue judgments that bind the parties to a 
lawsuit, it has no such power with respect to nonparties. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
(declining to invalidate laws that “may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought”). 
 2. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018) (“Nationwide injunctions come with significant costs 
and should never be the default remedy in cases challenging federal executive 
action.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National 
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 64 (2017) (“It is true that a national 
injunction . . . is hardly the ideal way to establish law and bind nonparties.”); Alan 
M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 105 
(2019) (arguing that “courts presumptively should not issue nationwide 
injunctions”); see also Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 
118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42 (2019) (arguing that courts should decline to issue 
nationwide injunctions when nonparties would not ordinarily be able to take 
advantage of nonmutual preclusion). 
 3. Compare Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National 
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 477–81 (2017) (making this argument), with 
Frost, supra note 2, at 1115–18 (arguing that the game is sometimes worth the 
candle); Malveaux, supra note 2, at 61–64 (same); Trammell, supra note 2, at 
105–11 (same). 
 4. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), revoked by 
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 5. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
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My goal here is to demonstrate that nationwide injunctions 
are consistent with the federal “judicial Power”6 and fit within 
the modern structure of adjudicating public rights. Until re-
cently, these conclusions might have seemed uncontroversial 
and perhaps even obvious, but the constitutional objections to 
nationwide injunctions have gained considerable traction. Sev-
eral scholars now contend that such injunctions are not simply 
a bad idea but that they also violate Article III of the Constitu-
tion.7 Since September 2018, the Department of Justice has 
adopted the same position and has directed its civil litigators to 
advocate that view in each case presenting even the possibility 
of a nationwide injunction.8 And Justice Thomas has endorsed 
this restrictive vision of Article III.9 Against that backdrop, 
this Essay confronts and dispels several interrelated argu-
ments. 
Part I considers two versions of the argument that judges 
who issue nationwide injunctions trench on the federal judicial 
power. The first version contends that in the absence of a 
properly certified class action, plaintiffs do not have standing 
to pursue a nationwide injunction. I argue that although a 
plaintiff indeed must demonstrate standing—both with regard 
to the injury complained of and the kind of remedy sought—the 
proper scope of that remedy is a separate question. The Su-
preme Court has recognized the distinction in an array of 
cases.10 
The second version is more amorphous. It insists that fed-
eral courts may bind persons to the results of a judgment only 
when adjudicating those persons’ actual disputes. Conversely, 
goes the argument, a federal court has no power to bind non-
parties because, by definition, it is no longer resolving a 
 
 6. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 7. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 3, at 471–72; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class 
Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election 
Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 523–27 
(2016); Howard W. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” 
Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 359–
63 (2018). 
 8. See Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to Heads of Civil Litigating 
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the 
Possibility for Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018). 
 9. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[Universal injunctions] appear to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on 
equitable relief and the power of Article III courts.”). 
 10.  See discussion infra Section I.A. 
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judicially cognizable dispute. This contention misses the mark, 
however, because judicial power has never been defined solely 
in terms of dispute resolution. Thus, even when a court issues a 
nationwide injunction that benefits nonparties, it still operates 
within the bounds of Article III. 
In Part II, this Essay addresses a contention that, strictly 
speaking, doesn’t purport to prove that nationwide injunctions 
are unconstitutional but nonetheless suggests that something 
is amiss. Specifically, several scholars argue that nationwide 
injunctions are a modern phenomenon,11 a claim that other 
scholars have shown is deeply misleading and possibly just 
wrong.12 But even if nationwide injunctions in their current 
form don’t have a long pedigree, their novelty is hardly evi-
dence of their unconstitutionality. Rather, they are part of a 
broader reordering of the relationship between citizens and 
their government, including citizens’ power to vindicate public 
rights in court. 
Few would doubt that nationwide injunctions raise a host 
of difficulties. Scholars are right to be concerned that courts 
might render inconsistent judgments, freeze the law prema-
turely, thwart percolation of important legal questions, or 
incentivize enterprising plaintiffs to engage in forum shop-
ping.13 Those and other prudential issues merit a robust 
debate.14 But manufacturing a constitutional home for the ob-
jections to nationwide injunctions distorts and impoverishes 
Article III. 
I. NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 
The core constitutional objection to nationwide injunctions 
is that they benefit nonparties. Proponents of this idea contend 
 
 11. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 3, at 437–38 (arguing that Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. 
Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963), was the first case in which a nationwide 
injunction was issued); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 353 (arguing that “the 
practice traces to the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 12. See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 3, at 457–64 (raising these objections); see also 
Clopton, supra note 2, at 37–44 (acknowledging these potential problems); Frost, 
supra note 2, at 1085–93 (same); Trammell, supra note 2, at 107–09 (same). 
 14. In fact, the prudential realm is where most of the debate has been taking 
place, as the sources in the immediately preceding footnote suggest. My own 
thoughts on how to navigate the prudential concerns with nationwide injunctions 
borrow largely from the theory and doctrine of issue preclusion. Principally, 
though, I concentrate here on debunking the constitutional objections. 
TRAMMELL_FINAL PROOF_4.17.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  5:16 PM 
2020] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INJUNCTIONS 981 
that the federal “judicial Power”15 confers authority to adjudi-
cate the parties’ rights and obligations but, conversely, no 
authority to bind or benefit nonparties directly.16 Where does 
this definition of judicial power come from? Certainly not from 
historical practice, as the next Section demonstrates.17 Alt-
hough understanding judicial power in terms of a crisp 
distinction between parties and nonparties has an alluring ele-
gance, it’s little more than an article of faith—and misplaced 
faith at that. 
A. Standing 
The judicial power argument basically comes in two ver-
sions. The first and most plausible variation is rooted in the 
Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, which the Court has 
long said derives from Article III. In essence, the argument 
contends that while a party to a lawsuit may seek a remedy on 
her own behalf, she lacks standing to pursue a remedy that di-
rectly and intentionally benefits nonparties.18 Although several 
scholars have eloquently defended this idea,19 it ultimately 
fails on both doctrinal and conceptual levels. Standing presents 
a quintessential threshold question, whereas the appropriate 
scope of remedy—including whether a remedy may directly 
benefit a nonparty—is a logically distinct matter. 
To see how scholars construct this argument, consider the 
basic doctrinal architecture that the Supreme Court has craft-
ed and reiterated over the last generation. In order to establish 
standing, a party to a lawsuit must allege (1) that she has suf-
 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
 16. See Bray, supra note 3, at 471 (“The court has no constitutional basis to 
decide disputes and issue remedies for those who are not parties.”); id. at 472 
(“Article III gives the judiciary authority to resolve the disputes of the litigants, 
not the disputes of others.”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff is Not 
Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 519 (2017) (arguing that courts properly exercise 
judicial power only when according relief to actual parties). 
 17. See Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff and 
Appellee the City of Chicago, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, No. 18-2885 (7th Cir. 
Nov. 15, 2018) [hereinafter Brief for Legal Historians]. 
 18. See, e.g., Morley, supra note 7, at 516 (arguing that “individual plaintiffs 
in non-class cases in federal court generally lack Article III standing to seek relief 
for anyone other than themselves”); see also Bruhl, supra note 15, at 519 (“Given 
that judgments operate for and against specific people, it follows that each person 
invoking this judgment-issuing power must have standing.”). 
 19. See Andrew Coan & David Marcus, Article III, Remedies, and 
Representation, 9 CONLAWNOW 97 (2018); Morley, supra note 7. 
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fered an “injury in fact,” which is “concrete and particularized” 
as well as “actual or imminent” in nature;20 (2) that the alleged 
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct;21 and (3) 
that a favorable decision can redress that injury.22 Further-
more, the Supreme Court has insisted that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate “remedial standing”23 for each form of relief that 
she seeks. So, someone who has alleged past harm—for exam-
ple, having been placed in an unlawful chokehold or been 
subject to discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law—has 
standing to pursue a backward-looking remedy, such as money 
damages. Unless the plaintiff can show a likelihood of future 
harm, however, that person lacks standing to seek a forward-
looking remedy, such as an injunction.24 
This much is fairly standard fare, but even this increasing-
ly demanding framework doesn’t speak to the propriety (or 
impropriety) of nationwide injunctions. To see how, consider 
the recent kerfuffle over whether a nationwide injunction 
against the enforcement of a new asylum regulation was ap-
propriate. On July 16, 2019, the Departments of Justice and 
Homeland Security issued a joint interim final rule that effec-
tively denies asylum to anyone trying to cross the United 
States’ southern border if that person did not first apply for 
asylum in Mexico (or another “third country”).25 Initially, the 
district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction,26 
which the Ninth Circuit narrowed in geographic scope.27 On 
September 9, 2019, the district court reinstated the nationwide 
 
 20. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 21. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law 
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984); see 
also David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 809 (2016) 
(similarly describing the “right plaintiff principle” as requiring that “[t]he remedy 
sought determines a plaintiff’s standing, not just the harm alleged”). 
 24. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–10 (1983); O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–99 (1974). 
 25. See Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 
(July 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1003, 1208); see also E. Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–30 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 26. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 385 F. Supp. at 960. 
 27. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that “we must grant the motion for stay pending appeal insofar as the 
injunction applies outside the Ninth Circuit”). 
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injunction,28 and two days later the Supreme Court stayed that 
injunction pending the appeal.29 So far, the entire debate has 
centered on how broadly the preliminary relief may extend. 
Amidst the whipsawing decisions about the propriety of 
the injunction’s scope, the various courts have treated standing 
and scope-of-remedy questions as logically independent of one 
another.30 The district court carefully elucidated why the advo-
cacy groups challenging the new asylum rule have standing,31 
and thus far no other court has even remarked on that conclu-
sion. In this case, there are proper plaintiffs, who have alleged 
injury and demonstrated standing to pursue a prospective eq-
uitable remedy, and they are doing so in the context of a live 
case or controversy. So, what’s the problem? And, more specifi-
cally, what does standing have to do with it? 
For those who argue that nationwide injunctions present a 
standing problem, the doctrinal hook is Summers v. Earth Is-
land Institute.32 In that case, a plaintiff who had visited a par-
ticular forest (and planned to do so in the future) had standing 
to seek an injunction against a regulation that authorized sal-
vage timber sales within various forests.33 The parties 
eventually settled their dispute regarding the forest that the 
plaintiff had actually visited. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the plaintiff’s injury had been redressed, such 
that he no longer had standing to challenge the regulation as it 
might apply to other timber sales in other forests.34 
Some scholars have inferred that the standing-conferring 
injury determines not just the kind of remedy that a plaintiff 
may pursue but also the scope of that remedy.35 And indeed, 
Justice Scalia, who authored Summers, later contended that 
 
 28. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(holding that “the Court grants the Organizations’ motion to restore the 
nationwide scope of the injunction”). 
 29. See Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3 (mem.) (2019). 
 30. Notably, the Solicitor General has argued that standing presents a major 
problem in this litigation and has suggested a link between standing and the 
appropriate scope of remedy. Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 20–21, 
Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, No. 19A230 (Aug. 26, 2019). So far, though, 
the courts consistently have refused to go down that path. 
 31. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 937, 960 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 32. 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009). 
 33.  Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Coan & Marcus, supra note 19, at 101–02; Morley, supra note 7, at 
523–24. 
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this is precisely what the Court meant in that case. In a later 
opinion joined by Justice Thomas, he cited Summers and ar-
gued that “[a] plaintiff cannot sidestep Article III’s 
requirements by combining a request for injunctive relief for 
which he has standing with a request for injunctive relief for 
which he lacks standing.”36 On this view, standing directly per-
tains to the scope-of-remedy question. Yoking those concepts 
could thus sound the death knell for nationwide injunctions, 
which (in their most problematic variant) extend relief to non-
parties whose standing a court has never verified. 
From a doctrinal perspective, though, the Supreme Court 
steadfastly decouples standing and scope of remedy. While the 
Scalia view of Summers might have an analytical elegance, it 
has never commanded more than two votes on the Supreme 
Court.37 Moreover, his view is exceedingly difficult (if not im-
possible) to reconcile with the traditional rule—which the 
Court has long embraced—that a “court’s equitable powers to 
remedy past wrongs [are] broad, for breadth and flexibility are 
inherent in equitable remedies.”38 This includes remedies that 
extend far beyond the actual plaintiffs to a lawsuit.39 There is 
a certain uneasiness in how the Court has navigated these doc-
trines, but even though it has tightened the standing 
requirements with respect to the kind of injury that a plaintiff 
must allege40 and the kind of remedy he may seek,41 it consist-
ently has treated the appropriate scope of remedy as a distinct 
question.42 All of this is to say that the Supreme Court’s cur-
 
 36. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 731 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis in original). 
 37. Only Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion. Id. 
 38. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (quoting Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)); see also Brown v. 
Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 538 (2011) (noting that “[c]ourts have substantial flexibility” 
in determining appropriate remedies). 
 39. The most obvious example is a prophylactic injunction. See infra notes 80–
88 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (insisting 
that alleged injury must be not only particular to the plaintiff but also sufficiently 
concrete in order to confer Article III standing). 
 41. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–10 (1983); Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–73 (1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–99 
(1974). 
 42. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 713 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(arguing that extent of relief concerned the merits, not standing); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (reaffirming that “the 
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy”). 
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rent doctrine strongly suggests that standing has no bearing on 
the basic problem of nationwide injunctions—that is, how 
broadly a remedy may sweep and, specifically, whether it may 
benefit people who were not actual parties to a lawsuit. 
On a conceptual level, the Court’s approach to scope-of-
remedy questions makes good sense. Standing is a threshold 
matter; it concerns the front-end of litigation—specifically, 
whether this plaintiff is the right person to challenge particular 
conduct and thus whether she is even allowed into federal 
court. By contrast, courts determine the appropriate scope of 
remedy, almost of necessity, on the back end of a lawsuit—after 
a plaintiff has proved that a defendant behaved unlawfully 
and, critically, shown the extent of the defendant’s violations. 
True, “a federal court is required to tailor ‘the scope of the rem-
edy’ to fit ‘the nature and extent of the . . . violation.’”43 But if a 
court issues a remedy that is too broad, the court has abused 
its equitable discretion—at the back end of litigation—in light 
of the violations shown.44 Any such mistake has nothing to do 
with the threshold question of standing. It’s just reversible 
error. 
To the extent that a conceptual oddity lurks in all of this, it 
doesn’t concern how the Supreme Court has treated the scope-
of-remedy question. Rather, it lies in the Court’s insistence—
expressed most famously in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons45—
that a plaintiff must show standing to pursue a particular kind 
of remedy, such as an injunction.46 Like the question of reme-
dial scope, the appropriate kind of remedy would seem to 
belong to the questions that a court can answer only after a 
fact finder has weighed the evidence, determined whether vio-
lations occurred, and assessed the extent of those violations. To 
put the point charitably, kind-of-remedy questions (as in Ly-
 
 43. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293–94 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974)). 
 44. Admittedly, a court doesn’t issue a preliminary nationwide injunction at 
the end of litigation. However, determining a provisional remedy’s scope still 
comes after a court decides whether provisional relief is appropriate at all. In 
other words, scope-of-remedy determinations come at the conclusion of that 
specific issue. 
 45. 461 U.S. at 101–03. 
 46. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 11. Professor Fallon termed this latter 
doctrine “remedial standing.” It very clearly refers to the kind, rather than the 
scope, of the remedy. 
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ons) fit uncomfortably with standing.47 Even if courts allow 
this conceptual error to persist, though, they should not permit 
it to metastasize. Indeed, courts correctly recognize that scope-
of-remedy questions—such as those concerning the propriety of 
nationwide injunctions—are important and often vexing, but 
they are not threshold justiciability questions and thus are dis-
tinct from standing. 
B. Dispute Resolution 
The second way that scholars have argued that nationwide 
injunctions run afoul of Article III is to suggest that the federal 
judicial power includes only the “power to decide a case for a 
particular claimant.”48 This implicitly invokes the dichotomy 
that scholars have long discussed between two models of adju-
dication—the dispute resolution model and the law declaration 
model. The dispute resolution model, which undergirds this 
particular constitutional argument against nationwide injunc-
tions, posits that a court’s proper role is to resolve the parties’ 
concrete disputes and answer larger legal questions only if nec-
essary. By contrast, the law declaration model views the 
Supreme Court’s primary role as an expositor of legal princi-
ples for society writ large.49 The models, of course, are 
constructs. Although the Supreme Court never explicitly in-
vokes or endorses them, they offer a useful way to understand 
and critique the Court’s practices. 
 
 47. See id. at 7 (arguing that Lyons’s treatment of kind-of-remedy questions 
as part of standing is “unnecessary and unfortunate” and that “the effectiveness of 
a particular remedy should play no part in article III standing analysis”). 
Professor Fallon suggests that the doctrinal mismatch—drawing certain remedial 
questions into the standing inquiry—was one of the only ways that the Supreme 
Court and other appellate courts could rein in trial courts that traditionally enjoy 
exceedingly broad discretion to order appropriate remedies. 
 48. See Bray, supra note 3, at 471; see also Bruhl, supra note 16, at 519 
(similarly arguing that “judicial power” connotes power to render a judgment in 
favor of an actual party). 
 49. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 73–75 (7th ed. 2015); see also, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of 
Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 499–508 (2009); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial 
Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 53–68 (2011); 
Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 
1952–53 (2016); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoidance, Agenda Control, and 
Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012). 
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Those who subscribe to the constitutional argument 
against nationwide injunctions begin with the axiom that the 
judicial power, by definition, entails only the power to resolve 
the actual parties’ actual disputes.50 More concretely, this axi-
om supposedly means that a court’s ultimate power rests in its 
authority to bind the parties through a judgment, which neces-
sarily is specific to those parties properly before the court.51 
Conversely, a court lacks power to bind anyone who isn’t actu-
ally before it.52 In this telling, nationwide injunctions violate 
the Article III judicial power precisely because they directly 
and intentionally, rather than just incidentally, accord relief to 
persons who are not parties to the lawsuit. 
This argument fails as a historical and descriptive matter. 
Since the inception of the Republic, federal courts have never 
understood their power solely in terms of resolving the parties’ 
specific disputes. Put somewhat differently, dispute resolution 
is not the definition of judicial power but instead is merely an 
attribute of judicial power, albeit the single most important at-
tribute.53 
Think back to Marbury v. Madison.54 The Supreme Court 
expounded upon judicial review and the duties of the highest 
officers in the federal government,55 all in a case over which it 
lacked jurisdiction. Perhaps more relevant for present purpos-
 
 50. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2427 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“American courts’ tradition of providing equitable relief only to the 
parties was consistent with their view of the nature of judicial power.”). 
 51. See Bruhl, supra note 16, at 519 (arguing that Article III judicial power is 
the “judgment-issuing power” and that judgments “operate for and against 
specific people”); see also Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of 
Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 244 (2016) (arguing that a 
“court’s judgment and injunction compel conduct by the named defendants as to 
the named plaintiffs”). 
 52. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 3, at 472 (“Article III gives the judiciary 
authority to resolve the disputes of litigants, not the disputes of others. Article III 
gives the judiciary authority to remedy the wrongs done to those litigants, not the 
wrongs done to others.”); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 359 (arguing that Article 
III judicial power “means power to decide cases or controversies for particular 
parties to a particular legal dispute” rather than to “decide general or abstract 
legal issues to provide remedies for people not before the court”). 
 53. The majority in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 756–59 (2013), 
hinted at this when it declared that adverseness is a prudential element of 
standing rather than a truly jurisdictional element of federal courts’ power. 
Justice Scalia, one should note, was apoplectic. Id. at 784 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[The majority] proceeds to call the requirement of adverseness a ‘prudential’ 
aspect of standing. Of standing. That is incomprehensible.”). 
 54. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 55. Id. at 166–71, 176–80. 
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es, federal courts often have answered pressing legal questions 
that arose in a friendly (that is, collusive) lawsuit in which the 
supposed dispute was a contrivance. Consider one of the earli-
est and most prominent examples, Fletcher v. Peck, in which 
the Court found that the Contract Clause prevented Georgia 
from voiding earlier land sales to private parties.56 The parties 
had arranged a nominal sale of land to get the case into federal 
court on diversity and secure a definitive ruling about whether 
the Georgia legislature had acted lawfully. Critically, they both 
wanted the same result: validation of their land titles.57 De-
spite the Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary,58 
federal courts have entertained many of these friendly lawsuits 
over the centuries—lawsuits in which there is no genuine dis-
pute for a court to resolve.59 
More recent practices confirm that dispute resolution has 
never been the definition of judicial power. The Supreme Court 
increasingly directs parties to brief new issues that the Court 
itself has added and appoints amici curiae to argue points that 
the parties do not actually contest.60 
Nothing refutes the dispute resolution view of judicial 
power as much as section 1983, one of the most important civil 
rights statutes, which the next Part explores more thoroughly. 
Those who subscribe to the dispute resolution view emphasize 
 
 56. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 57. See 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 583–93 (1919). 
Admittedly, everyone from the parties to the Supreme Court Justices had to 
pretend that the lawsuit presented a live, non-collusive controversy. But that was 
all pretense. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (“The 
Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, 
nonadversary, proceeding . . . .”); Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 
U.S. 339, 345 (1892) (“It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a 
party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the 
constitutionality of the legislative act.”). 
 59. Among the most infamous decisions ever rendered, Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), likely was a friendly case in which the parties 
colluded to create jurisdiction and in which “Dred Scott was simply a pawn in a 
jurisdictional game.” PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 
83–84 (1949). One commentator identified a particular variety of friendly 
lawsuit—intragovernmental test cases—from the early to mid-twentieth century 
in which the parties had only a “superficial appearance of adverseness” but 
shared a primary goal of securing a declaration that a statute or ordinance was 
valid. Note, Judicial Determinations in Nonadversary Proceedings, 72 HARV. L. 
REV. 723, 733–35 (1959). 
 60. See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 1901, 1953 (2016); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda 
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 680 (2012). 
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a critical difference between a judgment, which definitively re-
solves the parties’ rights and obligations, and precedent, which 
supposedly never binds nonparties directly.61 Professors 
Blackman and Wasserman articulate the point nicely: 
“[P]recedent, whether binding or persuasive, does not directly 
control real-world conduct. It instead must be put into effect by 
a Court issuing a new judgment . . . .”62 At least in the context 
of civil rights litigation, this is untrue. Section 1983 creates a 
cause of action when a state official violates a person’s federal 
civil rights.63 Although the official is usually entitled to quali-
fied immunity,64 a plaintiff may overcome that immunity by 
showing that the official violated law that was “clearly estab-
lished” under “cases of controlling authority” or even through a 
“consensus of persuasive authority.”65 In other words, section 
1983 imbues precedents with binding significance in the real 
world. More concretely, precedents create affirmative legal ob-
ligations for state officials, even if those officials were not 
parties to the precedent-making lawsuits. 
To be clear, I do not necessarily endorse all of these devel-
opments. The point is simply that the Article III judicial power 
has never been synonymous with the narrowly conceived no-
tion of dispute resolution that underpins several scholars’ 
constitutional arguments. Once that core predicate evaporates, 
the entire façade of the constitutional case against nationwide 
injunctions likewise collapses. What remains are cogent and of-
ten persuasive arguments that nationwide injunctions are 
fraught with serious concerns.66 But those arguments have 
nothing to do with the Constitution. Whether courts should ex-
ercise greater restraint in ordering remedies that benefit 
nonparties is not about enforcing the strictures of Article III so 
much as demonstrating prudence and good judgment. 
 
 61. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 16, at 506 (“Everyone gets the decision’s 
precedential value . . . but only the parties get the judgment that definitively 
decides their rights and liabilities.”); see also Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 
51, at 244 (arguing that a “court’s judgment and injunction compel conduct by the 
named defendants as to the named plaintiffs”). 
 62. Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 51, at 244. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 64. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
 65. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); see also D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. 
Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011). 
 66. See Trammell, supra note 2, at 107–09. 
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II. LITIGATING PUBLIC RIGHTS 
Although law “has been called the government of the living 
by the dead,” Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “the present has a 
right to govern itself so far as it can.”67 Federal courts took up 
that challenge in the middle of twentieth century. They became 
increasingly receptive to lawsuits that sought to vindicate pub-
lic rights and concomitantly developed several remedial 
innovations that were, and to an extent remain, controversial. 
Moreover, those developments laid the intellectual groundwork 
for modern nationwide injunctions. 
In recent years, a narrative has taken hold that (1) nation-
wide injunctions are a modern phenomenon and (2) the paucity 
of such injunctions over the centuries points to their in-
consistency with traditional equitable principles as well as the 
federal judicial power.68 Other scholars have pushed back 
against the first contention quite persuasively, and I will only 
summarize their excellent work, which I commend to the inter-
ested reader. As to the second point, I want to historicize 
nationwide injunctions by focusing on various procedural and 
remedial mechanisms that developed in the 1960s. Specifically, 
I situate nationwide injunctions within a broader jurispruden-
tial movement that has empowered citizens to enforce rights 
against the government. 
On the first point, the supposed novelty of nationwide in-
junctions, Professor Bray has asserted that the first nationwide 
injunction dates back to 1963.69 That claim is at best incom-
plete and possibly flat-out wrong. For centuries, courts of 
equity recognized a “bill of peace,” which Professor Bray con-
tends was not a precursor to the modern nationwide injunction 
but rather a “proto-class action” in which a discrete group of 
people with essentially identical claims were actually made 
parties to a single lawsuit.70 A number of historians have chal-
lenged Bray’s contention. A bill of peace, they argue, was 
 
 67. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 138, 138–39 (1920). Cf. DAVID MARANISS, FIRST IN HIS CLASS: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF BILL CLINTON 237 (1995) (describing an exchange in which then-
Professor Robert Bork told a student: “Just because you quote Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, don’t think it’s checkmate!”). 
 68. See Bray, supra note 3, at 425–44, 471–72; Wasserman, supra note 7, at 
353–63. 
 69. See Bray, supra note 3, at 437–38. 
 70. See id. at 426. 
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actually far closer to a nationwide injunction than a class ac-
tion precisely because all similarly situated persons were not 
necessarily joined as actual parties. Chancellors had broad dis-
cretion to order relief that benefited nonparties and, far more 
controversially, that commanded nonparties to take certain ac-
tions.71 In other words, equity countenanced exactly what 
makes nationwide injunctions controversial: ordering relief 
that directly applies to people who were not parties to the 
lawsuit. 
Further challenging the Bray argument, Professor Sohoni 
has demonstrated that as early as the 1890s, courts in the 
United States began to issue injunctions against both federal 
and state law, including for the benefit of nonparties.72 Now, 
an injunction against state law technically isn’t “nationwide” in 
scope, but that is really beside the point, as nearly everyone 
who writes about this topic recognizes.73 Rather, the critical in-
sight is that courts issued injunctions that consciously and 
directly affected nonparties. This summary doesn’t do justice to 
the careful and sophisticated work by these and other scholars, 
but their work makes clear that nationwide injunctions are 
neither unprecedented nor completely novel. 
Regarding the second point—the supposed constitutional 
dubiousness of a relatively new remedy—I want to take a 
slightly different tack by situating the modern nationwide in-
junction, and specifically the power to restrain executive 
action, within several other innovations. My concern here is 
several inflection points that redefined the role of courts in 
vindicating individual rights. The 1960s witnessed a funda-
mental structural shift as courts opened their doors to civil 
rights claims under section 1983,74 oversaw institutional re-
 
 71. See Brief for Legal Historians, supra note 17.  
 72. See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. 
L. REV. 920, 937–41 (2020). Professor Sohoni cites, for example, Reagan v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), Transcript of Record, at 276, and 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 517-18 (1898), as among the earliest examples of 
cases in which the Supreme Court explicitly countenanced relief that extended far 
beyond the actual parties to those cases. 
 73. For other work recognizing this point, see, for example, Bray, supra note 
3, at 419 n.5; Clopton, supra note 2, at 8; Frost, supra note 2, at 1071; Sohoni, 
supra note 72, at 929; Trammell, supra note 2, at 72; Wasserman, supra note 7, at 
338. 
 74. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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form from school systems to prisons,75 and aggregated claims 
(including school desegregation claims) through the advent of 
the modern class action.76 This historical moment—when 
courts assumed a more robust role in allowing citizens to hold 
their governments accountable for unlawful behavior—laid the 
intellectual groundwork for the nationwide injunction. Many of 
these developments remain controversial, but viewing them in 
context, one can see nationwide injunctions’ structural role and 
bona fides more clearly. In short, nationwide injunctions are 
not aberrant. They fit within a number of innovations that are 
consistent with the Article III judicial power. 
First, consider the Supreme Court’s seminal 1961 decision 
in Monroe v. Pape, which breathed life into what had been a 
dormant civil rights statute and transformed it into one of the 
most effective tools for combating violations of federally guar-
anteed rights.77 What is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
makes state officials liable when they act “under color of” state 
law and infringe someone’s federal civil rights. For nearly a 
century, courts had assumed that section 1983 was available 
only when state law explicitly authorized official conduct that 
resulted in a violation of federal rights. The theory was that an 
officer who was not in compliance with state law was acting 
ultra vires and thus no longer “under color of” state law.78 Giv-
en the restrictiveness of this interpretation, the statute had 
been “remarkable for its insignificance.”79 
 
 75. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(busing to ameliorate segregation); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prison 
reform). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (injunctive class action); see also, e.g., Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 77. 365 U.S. 167. 
 78. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (“[U]ntil some State law 
has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been 
taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any 
proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the prohibitions 
of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority.”); 
see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION 37 (4th ed. 2018) (observing that the Court did not “explicitly say 
that the acts of a state officer in violation of state law could not constitute the 
required state action” but that the Civil Rights Cases and other cases “seemed to 
imply as much”). 
 79. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., supra note 78, at 42. Between 1871 and 1920, 
plaintiffs had filed a total of only twenty-one lawsuits based on section 1983. See 
Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 
26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). In 1961, the year Monroe was decided, only 296 such 
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Monroe’s singular innovation was bringing official miscon-
duct within the purview of section 1983.80 That interpretive 
move is critical for present purposes because the Court recog-
nized that section 1983 was a necessary tool in fully 
vindicating rights that historically were underenforced, and it 
gave citizens a way to invoke courts’ assistance in achieving 
that goal. By way of illustration, think about a police officer 
who kicks down your front door, violating both state law and 
the Fourth Amendment. Before Monroe, you could not have 
used section 1983 to sue the officer for money damages. Your 
remedies were limited to seeking a prospective injunction 
against the officer through an Ex parte Young lawsuit (de-
manding that the officer respect your Fourth Amendment 
rights in the future) or bringing a garden-variety tort suit 
against the officer (say, for the cost of replacing the door). As 
Monroe observed, however, such remedies gave short shrift to 
the real value of the rights at stake.81 An injunction regarding 
future conduct can’t rectify the harm that you’ve already suf-
fered. Most importantly, there is a fundamental difference, 
however ineffable it might be, between a burglar who kicks 
down your door and a police officer—someone charged with 
protecting your rights—who does the same thing.82 
In short, Monroe squarely addressed the problem of un-
derenforcement and expressly gave federal courts a role in 
more completely vindicating civil rights. Moreover, in recon-
ceiving the sweep of section 1983, Monroe interpreted the 
statute in a way that lower courts for decades had assumed 
was unconstitutional.83 
 
lawsuits had been brought. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The 
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 662 (1987). 
 80. Specifically, Monroe held that section 1983’s requirement that an officer 
have been acting “under color of” state law did not require that state law explicitly 
permit the offending activity. Rather, an officer acting in violation of state law 
also became suable under section 1983. 365 U.S. at 183–87. 
 81. See id. at 183 (arguing that section 1983 is “supplementary to the state 
remedy,” regardless of whether a state remedy is available in theory or practice). 
 82. See id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that “a constitutional right 
is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right 
and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may 
constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right”). 
 83. See JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., supra note 78, at 37–38 (noting that in light of 
the Civil Rights Cases and other Supreme Court pronouncements, “a nineteenth-
century observer might reasonably have thought . . . that § 1983 would be 
unconstitutional unless it were limited to acts explicitly or impliedly authorized 
by state law”). 
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The second example of this structural reorientation is the 
emergence of prophylactic injunctions. Such injunctions seek to 
prevent future harm by regulating not just a defendant’s core 
illegal behavior, but also conduct that, while technically lawful 
on its own, contributes to the violations.84 Courts first issued 
this particular type of injunction in the 1960s.85 
The most conspicuous and controversial prophylactic in-
junctions often involve structural reform of school systems, 
prisons, and mental hospitals. A few high-profile examples il-
lustrate the point. In the wake of massive resistance to public 
school integration, federal courts issued detailed injunctions 
that included several prophylactic measures, such as busing, 
ratios, and redrawn attendance zones.86 A lack of busing had 
not caused the constitutional violation, but busing was a way to 
ameliorate the violation after school systems had persistently 
failed to cure it through other means. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a detailed injunction concerning the unconstitu-
tionally deplorable conditions in the Arkansas prison system.87 
And in one of the clearest examples of regulating affiliated law-
ful conduct, the Court in 2011 affirmed an injunction that 
potentially required California to reduce its prison population 
in order to remedy constitutionally deficient medical care.88 
The Court didn’t simply direct that injured prisoners receive 
appropriate care. Instead, with remarkable candor, it acknowl-
edged that it was attempting more broadly to reform conditions 
that had created an “extensive and ongoing constitutional 
violation.”89 
 
 84. See Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses 
and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 936–37 (1999); David S. 
Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the 
Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 678 (1988); Tracy A. 
Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional 
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314–15 (2004). 
 85. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 302 n.2 (identifying SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), as the “first example of the imposition 
of a remedy of prophylactic character”). 
 86. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 
(1971). 
 87. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (affirming injunction, 
including a firm thirty-day limit on “punitive isolation”). 
 88. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011). 
 89. Id. at 545. 
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Prophylactic injunctions have attracted a bevy of criticism 
over the years,90 in part because they raise serious concerns 
about the proper judicial role and the separation of powers.91 
On a conceptual level, though, they are consistent with the 
move toward vindicating underenforced rights and are argua-
bly appropriate in certain situations. This is particularly true 
when officials consistently and willfully flout their constitu-
tional obligations, such as during the massive resistance to 
school integration when certain officials did everything in their 
power not to comply with the Supreme Court’s directives.92 Ex-
traordinary lawlessness arguably warranted a new and 
extraordinary remedy. Regardless of the wisdom of any partic-
ular prophylactic injunction, such injunctions are part of the 
panoply of remedial innovations that arose in the last half 
century. 
Finally, consider the birth of the modern class action in 
1966 and its role in desegregation lawsuits. Chief among the 
new rule’s defining attributes was a robust preclusion rule93—
a newly devised power to bind all similarly situated persons, 
 
 90. See id. 557–58 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing structural 
injunctions as “the dressing-up of policy judgments as factual findings” and 
“invit[ing] judges to indulge incompetent policy preferences”) (emphasis in 
original); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(criticizing structural injunctions as “extravagant uses of judicial power” that are 
“at odds with the history and tradition of the equity power and the Framers’ 
design”); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional 
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637 (1982) (arguing that 
structural injunctions “must be regarded as presumptively illegitimate”); Donald 
L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public 
Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1303–07 (1983) (criticizing unintended 
consequences of structural injunctions). 
 91. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal 
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 712–18 (1978). 
 92. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 90, at 637 (arguing that “the presumption of 
illegitimacy may be overcome when the political bodies that should ordinarily 
exercise such discretion are seriously and chronically in default”); id. at 683 
(describing “lawless resistance” and courts’ actions “in the face of strenuous 
political opposition”); Thomas, supra note 84, at 380 (arguing that prophylactic 
injunctions are appropriate and effective to combat defendants’ resistance); see 
also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587–88 (1983). 
 93. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: 
Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 
609 (2011) (describing the modern Rule 23 as “first and foremost a res judicata 
device”); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 355 (arguing that “the very essence of the class 
action device is its capacity to bring closure to claims that stretch beyond the 
named parties”). 
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including absent class members, to the results of a single 
lawsuit. This naturally raised due process concerns.94 So, to 
address the problem that a judgment might be binding on an 
absent class member who did not have a genuine opportunity 
to participate in the lawsuit, the drafters of the modern class 
action rule crafted several protections. These included notice 
and opt-out rights for individual claimholders in class actions 
that sought to aggregate individual damages claims.95 
But in the context of classes seeking injunctive relief, those 
vital protections are conspicuously and curiously absent.96 
Scholars have defended this absence on various grounds, in-
cluding the idea that lawsuits seeking injunctive relief are, in 
fact, group rights that are often indivisible.97 In an illuminat-
ing piece about the origins of the modern injunctive class 
action, though, Professor David Marcus persuasively argues 
that the lack of notice or opt-out rights in these lawsuits owes 
far less to grand theory than to the drafters’ singular focus on 
desegregation cases.98 Even though the parties to those law-
suits often had very different preferences about the means and 
ultimate goals of the litigation, the drafters wanted to over-
come resistance to desegregation by school boards and judges 
alike.99 Opponents of desegregation had embraced a strategy of 
piecemeal litigation, recognizing that a single judgment on be-
 
 94. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty 
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 204 (1992) (noting that historically the right to 
participate in a lawsuit required that a litigant have “actual control over the 
lawsuit” and “all significant litigation decisions”); Alan M. Trammell, Precedent 
and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565, 578 (2017) (noting that “before 
preclusion may attach, each person presumptively is entitled to her own day in 
court as part of the due process right to be heard”). 
 95. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: 
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. 
L. REV. 657, 659, 708 (2011) (arguing that the drafters of the modern Rule 23 
regarded notice and opt-out rights as essential to ensure the constitutionality of 
Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 96. See Marcus, supra note 95, at 707 (noting that drafters did not seriously 
consider whether injunctive classes merited opt-out rights or similar protections). 
 97. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to 
Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–59 (2002) 
(describing certain injunctive claims as belonging to the group as such rather than 
individual litigants); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and 
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 918–34 (1998) (articulating and defending an 
“entity model” of class actions, in part because of the indivisibility of the relief 
sought). 
 98. See Marcus, supra note 95, at 706–08. 
 99. See id. at 664 (noting potential for conflicts within an injunctive class); id. 
at 702–08 (describing the desegregation motivation of Rule 23(b)(2)). 
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half of one student was virtually worthless. So, the only way to 
break the logjam of resistance was to channel the cases into 
class actions and, critically, prevent students and their parents 
from opting out.100 The architecture of the modern injunctive 
class was heavy-handed and perhaps even pedantic. Moreover, 
it arguably played fast and loose with litigants’ due process 
rights.101 Even though this innovation came dangerously close 
to a constitutional boundary, it has become entrenched as an 
essential tool of public rights litigation. 
* * * 
What does all of this have to do with nationwide injunc-
tions? First, this discussion suggests that the nationwide 
injunction isn’t a remedial anomaly. In the middle of the twen-
tieth century, a no-longer-toothless section 1983, prophylactic 
injunctions, and the modern class action all developed to con-
front the problem of underenforced civil rights. They are all 
part of a movement toward granting citizens greater power to 
vindicate rights vis-à-vis the government and entrusting feder-
al courts with a critical role in navigating that relationship. 
The modern nationwide injunction makes conceptual and doc-
trinal sense alongside these other innovations. 
Second, each innovation departed from received wisdom 
about what the Constitution required—whether it’s what 
counts as state action in constitutional torts or what due pro-
cess requires in aggregate litigation. So, it is hardly surprising 
that nationwide injunctions have also spawned constitutional 
objections based simply on the fact that they don’t conform to 
the way litigation looked decades or centuries ago. Each of 
these developments arguably pushed constitutional bounda-
ries, but the mere fact that they had not previously existed in 
their modern forms is hardly proof that they are unconstitu-
tional. Far from it. 
Finally, all of the innovations, including nationwide injunc-
tions, present a similar cautionary tale. They are powerful de-
vices that in critical circumstances can hold recalcitrant 
officials to account. To varying degrees, though, they all em-
body a risk that judges might deploy the devices reflexively and 
intrude into the political branches’ domain or disrespect the 
rights and interests of people who disagree with the aims of a 
 
 100. See id. at 706–08. 
 101. See id. at 709–11. 
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particular lawsuit. As I’ve argued elsewhere, courts and schol-
ars are right to worry that nationwide injunctions could run 
afoul of sensible prudential constraints on courts’ power.102 
But in all of these situations, that’s where the conversation 
should take place—in the realm of prudence. Simply because 
courts might abuse these devices (perhaps even in a way that is 
unconstitutional) does not mean that the devices themselves 
are unconstitutional. It means that courts and scholars are 
wise to think carefully about the circumstances in which they 
are most appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The elephant in the room is Donald Trump. Courts had is-
sued nationwide injunctions before he became President in 
2017, but this particular remedy took center stage within 
weeks of his inauguration. It has become intertwined with 
some of the most visceral debates in the current political age, 
from immigration and asylum to environmental protection and 
the rights of transgender service members. The substantive 
debates obviously matter. So, too, does the debate about the ju-
diciary’s proper role. 
Most of us have a tendency to cheer the results that corre-
spond with our substantive moral commitments. But what goes 
around comes around. Amidst the vociferous debates about 
substantive policies, we should be clear about what’s at stake 
when a court issues a nationwide injunction. There are myriad 
potential problems, as I and others have discussed. Courts 
should remain vigilant in guarding against those problems. At 
the same time, nationwide injunctions do not present a consti-
tutional problem, and courts and scholars do a disservice to 
federal courts when they wrap their policy disagreements in ill-
fitting constitutional garb. 
 
 102. See Trammell, supra note 2, at 105–09. 
